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Introduction 
 
 
The great aim and end of civil society is protection of the persons and properties of 
individuals by an equal contribution to whatever is necessary to attain and secure it.  For, 
since all the individuals who compose the union are to partake of its protection, and of 
every other benefit resulting from it; nothing can be more just than that the expences, 
burthens, and sacrifices, necessary to preserve it, should be equally distributed and 
proportionably sustained by all [sic].
1
  
 
 
 Eminent domain, or the taking of private property for the greater good, has been one of 
the most frequently cited topics in scholarship on the development of American law in the 
nineteenth-century.  Legal historians such as Morton J. Horowitz, Harry N. Scheiber, James 
Willard Hurst, Kermit L. Hall, and Lawrence M. Friedman have clearly illustrated the 
significance of eminent domain and its role in the development of American society.  Historians 
have suggested that eminent domain was initially utilized by the state to take private property for 
purposes of internal development—the building or widening of roads, canal construction, and the 
laying of railroad tracks.  In the early nineteenth century, however, the power of eminent 
domain, traditionally a power of the state, was devolved upon individually owned corporations.  
When this authority was granted to corporations, it was as if the corporations, rather than the 
states, gained the sovereignty and authorization to expropriate land as needed.  While the courts 
were still used when corporations were confronted with stubborn property owners who slowed 
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what was supposed to be an expedited process, corporations began to exercise the power that 
state legislatures once held.  As a result of this transferal of power, the institution of eminent 
domain flourished within America.
2
 
 The key assumption that has led historians to base most of their analyses on the 
nineteenth century and the cause of internal development is that the overall position of 
legislators, justices, and businessmen tended towards the protection of capital and the 
preservation of potentially productive land.
3
  Thus, the taking of privately owned land under 
eminent domain law has been intimately linked to the development and growth of capitalism in 
the Unites States.  This fact has led historians to utilize eminent domain as an avenue for 
explaining why actions taken in “the name of vested rights had less to do with protecting 
[private] holdings,” as was considered by many to be the most basic purpose of law, “than it had 
to do with protecting [public] ventures.”
4
   
 Given the numerous analyses of eminent domain in nineteenth-century America, one may 
wonder what role this legal device played in late-eighteenth-century or post-revolutionary 
America.  In his Bancroft Prize winning analysis of the development of American law, The 
Transformation of American Law, 1780-1860, Horowitz even considered the fact that “given the 
central role that eminent domain played in legal controversy during the nineteenth century, it is 
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rather surprising to see how infrequently it arose as a legal question before that time.”
5
  But 
Horowitz makes a critical error when he assumes that questions and legal disputes involving 
eminent domain or governmental takings were relatively uncommon prior to the nineteenth-
century.  He assumes the early state governments did not utilize eminent domain solely because 
the term ‘eminent domain’ does not appear in the sources.  This is simply not the case.   
 The right of a sovereign power to confiscate an individual’s property was not an 
innovation of nineteenth-century American law.  The nineteenth-century American law of 
eminent domain is only one episode in the continuous development of a sovereign’s power to 
regulate property that can be identified as far back as the eighth-century BCE.  This study will 
suggest that eminent domain, though not necessarily classified as such, was a significant factor in 
the development of America in the years following the Declaration of Independence and the 
conclusion of a successful revolution.   
My dissertation will be divided into six sections—a brief history of state takings, the 
cause of the Loyalists, the abolition of entail, internal development prior to the nineteenth 
century, Indian removal, and the abolition of slavery.  The discussion of these causes within the 
context of the developing understanding of eminent domain will provide evidence that indicates 
that a reassessment of eminent domain and state takings is in order.  While eminent domain has 
largely been understood as an artifact of the process of internal development and 
industrialization, eminent domain also needs to be recognized as an artifact of the independence 
movement and the building process of the state.  Today I would like to present the case of the 
Loyalists. 
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Cause of the Loyalists 
 
 
 In times of such commotion as the present, while the passions of men are worked up to an 
uncommon pitch there is great danger of fatal extremes…Irregularities I know are to be 
expected, but they are nevertheless dangerous and ought to be checked, by every prudent 
and moderate mean.
6
 
 
 
 Out of all of the founding fathers, Alexander Hamilton best understood the unjust and 
disturbing nature of the governmental and popular actions against those colonists who remained 
neutral or loyal to the British Crown during the revolution.  Whether this was the result of his 
being born outside of the British North American colonies or his living in a colony that claimed 
one of the highest loyalist populations, it is clear that he was uncomfortable with the many acts 
of legislation and popular publications made against this loathed cohort.  Hamilton was not, 
however, against the suppression of the Tories and their attempts to rally support for their cause.  
But he was, as a man well versed in the law and legal theory, in favor of remedying the loyalist 
problem through legal means that were not overtly injurious to their former brethren.
7
 
 Ideally, the problem of the loyalists was supposed to be resolved through the definitive 
peace treaty signed by British and American representatives in September of 1783 in Paris.  
Unfortunately, while two of the ten articles explicitly dealt with the issue of loyalists in America, 
only one of them left no room for interpretation.  Article VI unquestionably states that no future 
confiscations or injuries may be committed against anyone who was thought to have been 
associated with the enemy at any point during the war.
8
  Article V, while much more lengthy 
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 The intent of Article V of the Treaty of Paris was to see the properties of those British 
subjects who did not take up arms against the patriots returned to their owners.  The article 
requests that Congress “earnestly recommend it to the legislatures of the respective states” to 
allow British subjects to remain in the colonies up to “twelve months, unmolested in their 
endeavours [sic] to obtain the restitution of such of their estates, rights and properties as may 
have been confiscated.”
9
  While Congress could suggest that the states uphold the sentiment 
expressed in the treaty, the ultimate control over confiscated property rested in the hands of 
thirteen individual state governments—many of the same state governments that were in debt 
following a very costly war.
10
   
As J. Franklin Jameson has illustrated in his landmark lecture series The American 
Revolution Considered as a Social Movement, states that previously housed large Tory 
populations sought to gain a great deal of hard currency from confiscating the estates of the 
perceived traitors.  Even the states that were home only to one or two large loyalist estates would 
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have benefited from such confiscation acts.
11
  As a result, each state fashioned its own laws 
regarding the confiscation of loyalist property that would best suit both its social and fiscal 
needs.  Prior to 1783 and the passage of the Treaty of Paris, the laws passed by each state were 
justifiable under the law of nations.  As Hugo Grotius suggested in 1625 in his study The Rights 
of War and Peace, in times of war it was just to punish anyone who was believed to be 
committing treason against the authorities.  Who better fit this characterization than the loyalists?  
In the eyes of the patriots, the loyalists not only refused to join the rebel alliance, but also acted 
out against their former colonial brethren.   
New York was one of the first states to begin passing legislation intended to 
disenfranchise the loyalists.  By examining the legislation of New York, the reactions to the 
confiscation process, and its relationship to the concept of government takings, it will be possible 
to discern that the power of eminent domain was not always utilized for purposes of 
improvement.  In the case of the loyalists, the state clearly utilized its authority over 
expropriation to punish those who did not fall in line with the rebellion against Britain.     
As early as 1775, the legislature of New York began passing laws that were described by 
the editor of a pamphlet published in London as thoroughly “Vindictive [in] Spirit.”
12
  Thomas 
Jones, a lawyer and representative of the loyalist cause, attested to this description, finding that 
the most prevalent loyalist complaint focused on the idea that the government, under military 
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control, was confiscating loyalist property for their own “ease, pleasure, diversion, and 
emolument.”  Furthermore, there were no courts that would hear their cases except for those 
“arbitrary, illegal, despotic, and unconstitutional Courts, called ‘Courts of Police.’”
13
 
By 1783, however, the position of the loyalists had changed—the war was officially over 
and the Treaty of Paris was enacted.  No longer was it justifiable for the state legislature to 
expropriate and destroy loyalist property.  When the definitive treaty was signed between the 
United States and Great Britain and Congress recommended that the states take Article V into 
full consideration, the obstinate Senate and House of New York State refused to cede any ground 
to the loyalists who were stripped of their property at the start of the revolution.  In the opinion 
of the New York legislature, it was the behavior of the loyalists who lived within the state that 
took actions, not the laws, which could be viewed as anything but vengeful.  The loyalists had 
“cruelly massacred without Regard to Age or Sex, many of our [New York’s] Citizens, and 
wantonly desolated, and laid Waste, a great Part of this State,” and, therefore, could never have 
their rights of citizenship restored.
14
  
 But how seriously should these moral and righteous defenses of the legislation previously 
passed and refusal to enforce Article V of the Treaty of Paris be taken?  Did not the patriots also 
participate in the destruction of property, particularly the property belonging to their perceived 
enemies, throughout the revolution?  Were not many loyalists also “reduced to Poverty and 
Distress” as a result of patriot actions?  Were the patriots simply rationalizing their extra-legal 
actions?  James Rivington, a loyalist printer, for example, suffered a great deal at the hands of 
patriots such as Isaac Sears, John Lamb, and Marinus Willett.  The destruction of Rivington’s 
printing apparatuses in 1775 and eventual forced suspension of his presses on December 12, 
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1783, should not be considered any differently than the suggested actions of the loyalists.
15
  
Property of loyalists and patriots should not be considered as two separate entities.  Alexander 
Hamilton, while no supporter of Rivington, found the actions of the Sons of Liberty against him 
to be particularly egregious. 
 It cannot be sufficiently supported, then, that the legislature of New York had such pure 
motives as avenging the destruction of property within the state; if this were indeed the case, 
then extra-legal actions would not have been taken against the loyalists.  There is, however, 
evidence in support of the state utilizing its authority to expropriate and refuse to restore the 
property of the loyalists in order to raise funds.  The law passed by the House and Senate of New 
York in 1784 entitled “An Act for the Speedy Sale of the confiscated and forfeited Estates within 
this State, and for other Purposes therein mentioned” exemplifies this motive. 
 This purpose of this act was to direct how the property confiscated by the state from the 
loyalists “should be sold and converted into Money, and otherwise applied for sinking and 
discharging the public Securities.”
16
  However, on May 12, 1784, Gouverneur Morris delivered a 
message from the Council of Revisions expressing objection to the motion that “An Act for the 
Speedy Sale of the confiscated and forfeited Estates…” become a law of the state.  The Council 
of Revisions believed that the act was “inconsistent with the Public Good.”
17
  Recall that the 
states authority to confiscate property was premised upon the notion that it was being taken for 
the ‘good of the community’.   
The Council of Revisions believed that this act was contrary to the public good based on 
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two principle objections:  Firstly, they believed that placing the sole power to “sell and dispose 
of all Lands, Tenements, Hereditaments and Real Estate” within the hands of seven 
Commissioners of Forfeiture who had the power to convey and execute deeds that would be 
good in law was a mistake.  Giving seven men the ability to regulate all the confiscated property 
within the state without any checks on their power would leave the state helpless if they should 
abuse their position through any type of misconduct.
18
  Secondly, they believed it was not lawful 
to accept the certificates issued to the inhabitants of the state by the Continental Loan Officer as 
payment for property within the state since the certificates were representative of the national 
debt, not the debt of New York alone.  Similarly to that of the possibility of corruption within the 
Commissioners of Forfeiture, the council believed that in accepting certificates issued by the 
United States, they would be “open[ing] a Door to fresh Frauds, and giv[ing] a certain Disguise 
and Covering to past ones.”
19
  
In spite of the objections of the Council of Revisions, the Senate affirmed that the act 
should become a law of the state.  With the affirmation of the House, the act became an official 
law of New York despite the fact that everyone was not in agreement that it was in the best 
interest of the public and that Congress had urged the states to seriously consider returning 
confiscated estates to their former owners.  The process of proposing, attempting to revise, and 
passing this act illustrates not only divisions caused by the subject of loyalists and the seizing of 
their property, but also that many legislators were both thinking and writing within the guidelines 
of eminent domain that were expressed in Emerich de Vattel’s The Law of Nations.
20
  However, 
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In 1783, prior to the passage of “An Act for the Speedy Sale of the confiscated and 
forfeited Estates…,” the Board of American Loyalists issued a tract which clearly outlined all of 
the reasons why the state legislatures were wrong for denying indemnification for the loyalist 
property that was taken.  The central argument made in this publication is clearly stated.  While 
the board concedes that the acts passed by the states “are justifiable under the fundamental law of 
eminent domain,” he contends, utilizing the authority of Samuel von Pufendorf, that restitution 
must also be made for their individual sacrifices for the general safety of the public.
21
  What is 
further, according to most jurists and political theorists who wrote treatises on the law of eminent 
domain, even when “a prince is compelled, by necessity, to alienate in a treaty a part of his 
dominions, the losses of individuals, whose fortunes are sacrificed to the national safety, must be 
made good by the nation.”
22
   
The Board of American Loyalists defend their claims even further against the belief that 
no person who committed treasonous acts against the newly formed government should have 
their property returned or receive compensation for their property.  Numerous examples of the 
governments representing the side of the winning country replacing the government of the losing 
country are provided.  After the war between Spain and what became the independent States of 
Holland, anyone who had lost more than their fair share of property in the name of the public 
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good would have their estates restored to them or receive a monetary compensation.  The Treaty 
of Utrecht signed at the conclusion of Queen Anne’s War provided for the return of two 
prominent families estates.  Perhaps most closely related to the situation of the loyalists is the 
treatment of French inhabitants of Canada after it was ceded to Britain during the Seven Years 
War.  French inhabitants who would not become subjects of Britain were given complete access 
to dispose of their property or move it in a timely manner to French territory.
23
 
Although the argument may be made that since loyalists remained subjects of the British 
Crown, it should be the British nation, not the American nation that should be responsible for 
restorations.  The fact that British representatives did require the inclusion of Articles V and VI 
in the definitive treaty indicates that the British government did make arrangements for 
restoration of loyalist property and that the United States Government voluntarily took the power 
of compensation into their own hands.  Unfortunately, as many letters of Alexander Hamilton 
indicate, not only did the states refuse to take Article V into consideration, but many legislatures, 
and in Hamilton’s case the New York legislature, actively ignored the Article VI, which ordered 
the mandatory cessation of the seizure of loyalist estates.  In Hamilton’s opinion, this refusal to 
comply with both articles in the Treaty of Paris created much more danger than that posed by the 
loyalists.  In a letter to George Clinton, Hamilton suggests that if the states continue to ignore 
certain aspects of the treaty, the possibility of renewed warfare may become a reality: 
In the eye of a foreign nation, if our engagements are broken, it is of no moment whether 
it is for the want of good intention in the government or for want of power to restrain its 
subjects.  Suppose a violence committed by an American vessel on the vessel of another 
nation upon the high seas and after complaint made, there is no redress given.  Is not that 
a hostility against the injured nation which will justify reprisals?
24
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Not only does the refusal of state governments to return the property of loyalists or 
compensate them in another fashion seemingly undermine the laws regulating the power of 
eminent domain, but the refusal also undermines the laws of nature and nations.  However, there 
is also another major issue that the state governments speak to through both their unwillingness 
to compensate the loyalists and cease hostilities against the estates of those who remained—
sovereignty.  The state governments seem to be claiming sovereignty in the mere act of 
exercising the right to expropriate and regulate property.  But they are also undermining the 
national governments position of sovereignty over the power of making treaties with other 
nations.      
